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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

I

SALT LJ\KE CITY, a municipal
corporation,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
PEGGY ALLRED, aka PEGGY

Case No.
10752

LOVEJOY,~aTHELMA

ALLRED,

Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE
IN SUPPORT OF RESPONDENT'S
PETITION FOR REHEARING

The Utah Municipal League, Utah State Association of County Officials, and the Salt Lake County
Bar Legal Services, Inc., submit the fallowing brief
amicus curiae in support of Salt Lake City's petition
for rehearing.
The interests of all cities and local governments
in the State of Utah are directly concerned in this suit.
The Court has adopted a hasty position as the rationale
1

behind its deeision in this case which if carried to its
logical extreme ~would seriously cripple municipal and
local guyernment at a time when the cities and towns
of this state, and indeed the nation as a whole, are badly
in need of opportunities to attempt flexible alternative
solutions to their many problems.

ISSUE OF CONTENTION
The Court's initial decision in the instant case ruled
that Subsections 7 and 8 of Title 32 Chapter 2, Revised
Ordinances of Salt Lake City, 1965~ were unconstitutional. The crux of the Court's decision and the part
that is of questionable rationality states:
"We are of the opinion that the State by enacting comprehensive and complete laws pertaining to sexual offenses has pre-empted that
field. It does not appear that the State intended
that municipalities deal with these offenses except in those areas pertaining to prostitution
where the legislature had made specific grants
of authority to municipalities as set forth above.
"It is elementary that municipalities are limited by express grants of power from the legislature or as necessarily implied from such grants.
It appears that the ordinance we have under
consideration gties beyond the g1;ant of any legislatiYe authority granted to the City and is
therefore invalid. It must be conceded that the
legislature did not intend to grant to cities the
authority to prohibit acts of misdemeanors which
the State has denounced as felonies.
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''Our decision representing the ordinance will
in no way hamper the police in dealing with
vice as it is the duty of the police officers to enforce State law as well as municipal ordinances."
Thus the Court has a pp lied for the first time in
the history of Utah jurisprudence the concept of "preemption by implication." Nowhere in the Utah Criminal
Code (Title 76 Utah Code Ann. 1953) of the State
of Utab is there any express declaration by the Legislature that that portion of the Code relating to sexual
offenses (Chapter 53, Title 76, Utah Code Ann. 1953)
was extended to pre-empt the cities, towns and counties
of this State from passing ordinances relating to sexual
offenses not inconsistent with State law. Indeed, as
will be seen later the provisions of State law governing
sexual offenses were not passed at the same time, but
were passed sporadically and in such a fashion that
it could never be said that at any time did any one
legislator or the Legislature itself intend to pre-empt
the area.

It is the ominous and serious implications attendant
to the concept of State pre-emption with which the
amicus parties are concerned.
PRE-ElVIPTION IN UTAH LAVV
It is submitted that the concept of State preemption is alien to prior precedents from this court.

In A 11ierican Fork v. Charlier, 43 Utah 231, 134
Pac. 739 ( 1913), American Fork City, in the face of
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extensive State liquor regulation (Utah Laws 1911,
Chap. 10() Sec. 65), passed an ordinance prohibiting
the sale of intoxicating liquors. The court rejected a
contention that American Fork could not prohibit the
sale of liquor merely because the State law also contained some regulation of the matter. Quoting from
Salt Lake City v. Flowe, 37 Utah 170, 106 Pac. 705
(1912), the court observed:
"The Legislature could confer police powers
upon the municipality over subjects within the
provisions of existing state laws, and authorizes
it, by ordinance, to prohibit and punish acts which
are also prohibited and punishable as misdemeanors under the general statutes of the state.'·
The Court then went on to note:
"The overwhelming weight of authority in
this country is to the effect that, where such
power is conferred upon municipalities, they
may prohibit and punish the same acts that are
prohibited and punished by the state laws, al}d
may impose the same penalties imposed by the
state laws, if within the jurisdiction of the
municipal courts."
In the same case the Court expressly noted:
"The California cases cited by counsel can be
gi,·en no weight under the statutes of this state."
The concept of pre-emption has had a long history
of application in California. Note, The California City
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·cersus Preemption by Implication, 17 Hastings L. J nl.
G03 ( 1966) .

Although in the Charier case the statute in question seemed to dearly confer the power of municipal
regulation, it is noteworthy that the court seemed to
indicate the absence of any conflict between State law
and local ordinance would allow a city to pass an ordinance on the very same subject the State had legislated on if there was any reasonable grant of authority
to local governments for such regulation.
A similar result was reached in Tooele City v.
II offman, 4<2 Utah 596, 134 Pac. 558 ( 1913). In addition the Court observed as to the Charlier case:
"\Ve there held that a municipality may prohibit and punish acts which are also prohibited
and punished as misdemeanors under general
statute of the state, and that it may prescribe
a fine and penalty for a violation of its ordinance
the same as or different from that prescribed
by the statute for a violation of the statute regarding the same subject-matter, providing the
fine or penalty prescribed by the municipality
is within the power conferred upon it to prescribe fines and penalties."
Thus the Court even recognized the power of a
city to proscribe a different penalty than State law.
During the same time span, in Salt Lake City v.
Duran, 42 Utah 401, 131 Pac. 636, (1913), this court
upheld the power of Salt Lake City to pass an ordinance controlling gambling even though a State law
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comprehensively covered the matter.< 1 > In doing so the
court noted:
''ln making this statement, we are not unmindful of the general rule that city authorities
may exercise such powers only as are expressly
conferred, or necessarily implied. 'Ve think the
power to suppress slot machines is clearly and
intentionally conferred by what is said in subdivision 40 of section 206, supra.

"Nor do we think that the power to suppress
gambling by cities authorities is limited to the
precise games mentioned in section 4261. In our
opinion the city authorities are given the express
power to suppress all gambling and gambling
devices regardless of whether they are enumerated in or in express terms covered by said
section or not. There is absolutely nothing contained in the Constitutoin of this state which
prevents the legislature from conferring power
upon the cities of this state to suppress all forms
of gambling. The power to do so is clearly given
in the statute to which we have referred. Under
the power thus given, we think the cities of the
state to which the statute applies not only have
the power to punish all gambling which is punishable by the state law ( lVIcQuillin, Mun. Ord.
sec. 500), but they may also suppress gambling,
should be noted in respondent's brief in the case - p. 403,
42 Utah Repol'ts, cases are cited holding a city may punish
as a misdemeanor the same conduct the state punishes as
a felnny. The concept may be based upon the theory that
the city and State are separate sovereigns for double jeopardy
purposes. See Gross, Successive Prosecutions by City and
State. The cases nationally appear split. McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, ~ 17.15. The dicta in Utah cases appears
in conflict. See Salt Lake City v. Howe, supra, and compare with the language in Tooele City v. Hoffman, supra.
The decision in State v. Carnea, 44 Utah 353, 140 Pac. 670,
involved conflicting state statutes and did not raise the issue
here raised.

(1) It
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gambling devices, and games that are not enumerated in the state law. That is, under such a
power, as it is expressed by the Supreme Court
of California in Ex parte Hong Shen, 98 Cal.
681, 33 Pac. 799, 'there may be different regul_ations without conflict,' covering the same subJect matter, one for the cities and another for
the state at large. Or as is said in 28 Cyc. 701:
'Additional regulation by the ordinance does not
render it void.' "
In Zamata v. Browning. 51 Utah 400, 170 Pac.
1057 ( 1918), the court refused to find that State assmnption of control of alcoholic beverages impliedly
removed the right of cities to also control the area. ( 2)
In Salt Lake City v. Kusse, 97 Utah 113, 93 P. 2d
671 ( 1938) this Court upheld the power of Salt Lake
City to pass an ordinance regulating drunk driving,
although the Legislature had passed a State law on
the subject. The Court upheld the cities' power under
15-8-30 and 15-8-84 RSU 1933.0) In Kusse this court
stated:
"An ordinance dealing with the same subject
as a statute is invalid only if prohibited by the
statute or inconsistent therewith."
There is nothing in the Salt Lake City Ordinances
under 32-2-1, (1965) which is contrary to State law
nor does State law expressly prohibit the passage of
such ordinances. Further, supplementary regulation
(2) It may be that this case could be said to turn on Ogden City's
"home rule" charter, but the opinion does not clearly so
indicate.
(3) The cited statute is currently 10-8-84, U.C.A. 1953.
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not disallowed is proper with reasonable legislative
grant. Salt Lake City v. Doran, supra.
Although in Pleasant Grove v. Lindsay, 41 Utah
154, 125 Pac. 389 (1912), this court did not seem to
allude to a concept of implied pre-emption it was in
a most special context. That of terminating a prosecution under a city ordinance impliedly repealed by a
subsequent State law, although the State law did not
prohibit prospective regulation of the same subject
matter. The case offers no real support for the application of pre-emption now and is greatly weakened if
not rejected by subsequent case law.
It is therefore respectfully submitted that Utah
case law does not support the pre-emption concept in
Utah law absent ( 1) express pre-emption or ( 2) a
case where because of the nature of the activity regulated no other regulation except uniform state regulation would be feasible.

STATUTORY PRE-EMPTION
It is further submitted that the Utah statutes do
not pre-empt the area of sexual offense or prostitution
control from local action or evidence any legislative
intent to do so.

First, nowhere in Chapter 53, Title 76, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, is there any prohibition against agreeing to perform an act of prostitution nor prohibiting
prostitution as such, except to the extent the conduct
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might constitute fornication and violate 76-53-5
'
U.C.A., 1953, or in particular circumstances adultery,
7u-53-3, U.C.A., 1953.
Secondly, the great majority of statutes in Chapter 53, Title 76, U.C.A., 1953, were carryovers from
territorial laws and were enacted by the first Legislature in 1898. Such was the case with the statutes
governing adultery and fornication, 76-53-3 and 5,
U.C.A., 1953, (RS. 1898 §§ 4210, 4212). Certainly
at that time the Legislature could not have intended
to preclude cities and towns as well as other local
governments from enacting ordinances dealing with
sexual offenses since at the same time both cities and
towns were given authority to enact such laws, 108-·H, 51, U.C.A., 1953 (RS 1898, §§ 206 Sub. 40 and
54<); 10-13-9, 11, U.C.A.,1953 (RS 1898 § 302 Sub .
. 8 and 10). Thus at the same time State laws were
being enacted in the same general area, local bodies
were given express authority to deal with the problem of prostituton and sexual improprieties including
obscenity and lewdness. In addition a simple perusal
of the same general parts of Title 10, Chapter 8, 13
and Title 76 will demonstrate that at the same time
the Legislature passed many other State laws dealing
with control of tobacco, assault and battery, etc., it
also gave cities and towns authority to deal with the
same areas, thus evidencing no intention to pre-empt
local authority in acting in similar areas.
The provisions of Title 76, Chap. 53, U.C.A.,
1953, dealing with pandering, placing a wife in a house
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of prostitution, profiting off the earnings of a fallen
1voma11, detaining in a house of prostitution, and transportation for prostitution were enacted in 1911. During
the same Legislature the powers of cities and towns
lo deal with prostitution and sexual misconduct were
expanded and re-enacted (L. Utah, 1911, Ch. 120 § 1,
Ch. 100 § 1, Ch. 123 § 1). Under these circumstances
it could hardly be said any concept of State pre-emption
was intended, or any intent to narrowly circumscribe
the powers of local government to deal with prostitution or comparable sexual misconduct.
76-71-1 (10), U.C.A., 1953, provides:

"Every common prostitute and every woman
who from the doorways on the streets or any
other place solicits men for immoral purposes."
This provision was also first enacted in 1898 (R.S.
1893 § .Ji-k72), but without the reference to "solicitation
for immoral purposes". That language was added in
1909 (L. 1909, Chap. 5 § 1). Consequently, at the
time 7u-61-l, U.C.A, 1953, was first passed the local
municipalities were also given power to regulate the
same matter, and subsequent to 1909 their authority
in the same area was expanded and re-enacted. Consequently, no claim for pre-emption came from the
Legislative history of the laws dealing with sexual
offenses and prostitution in general.
In addition the Legislature saw fit to pass statutes
allowing the suppression of brothels as a nuisance. These
statutes, Title 47, Chapter 1, U.C.A., 1953, were not
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passed until 1913 and appeared merely to provide another alternative remedy for dealing with the same
problem and do not seem to preclude local suppression
of brothels or houses of prostitution since no effort
was made to replace those sections allowing local communities to suppress houses of prostitution.
One of the most striking realizations is that the
modern innovator the "call girl" in her customary
practice of being the solicitee is completely free of
regulation under State law, except if proof of fornication can be had which is virtually impossible.
THE CONCEPT OF PRE-EMPTION AS
APPLICABLE TO THE REGULATION
OF PROSTITUTION
The basic concept of pre-emption is alien to the
area where the court's decision has a pp lied it. Nothing
in the legislative history of the enactment of the laws
regulating sexual offenses in the State of Utah evidences any express or implied intent on the part of the
Legislature to preclude local governments from also
attempting to suppress the difficult social problem of
the sex offender. Generally, before the concept of preemption is applicable it must be demonstrated that
there is some special need for uniform regulation for
exclusion of local governments. For example, the
United States Supreme Court has found that a concept
of federal pre-emption which precludes states activities is necessary in the field of labor law for uniformity
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in <lealing with problems of such broad scope of laborm;:uagement relations. Garner v. Teamsters Union,
346 U.S. 485 ( 1953) . No such necessity for uniform
regulation is perceived with reference to the control
of prostitution or its allied activities or sex offenses
which necessarily have historically been a matter for
local suppression. The very concept of pre-emption
is incompatible with the subject matter in the instant
case. (1) It is therefore submitted that since the subject
matter of the instant controversy involves the exercise
of police powers that in the absence of some very compelling need for uniformity a determination that state
law has pre-empted municipal activity in the area is
not well taken.
The Utah State Legjslature meets for only sixty
days every biennium. All of the minor problems which
may confront police authorities in various municipalities cannot be adequately treated during a State legislative session. Any innovations in criminal activities
which are constantly occurring require some flexibility
in order to avoid serious injnry to the community. Local
governments have the capacity of providing flexible
alternatives to the meeting of local problems. Various
forms of solutions may be attempted by municipal
governments as local needs dictate. An excellent testing ground for governmental solutions to community
problems is therefore provided by allowing local governments reasonable flexibility in meeting their par( 4) For an excellent discussion of the federal rule of the preemption doc1rin2, see Flynn, Federalism and State Antitrust
Regulation, Chapter III, 1964.
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ticular problems. The doctrine of pre-emption is alien
to this concept. In California pre-emption has caused
a hodge-podge of confusion and has been:
"Criticized by local officials, who contend
that, as a result of these cases, much of their
local law is of questionable validity. One city
attorney has pointed out that uncertainty in
the law not only hampers enforc~ent officers,
administrators, attorneys, and judges, but also
confuses most of the public who no longer know
how much of their conduct is regulated by local
laws." 17 Hastings L. J., supra, p. 603.
It would therefore seem inappropriate to apply and
give sustenance to the concept of pre-emption in the
absence of a rather obvious intent on the part of a
Legislature for the invocation of the rule or where a
matter commands the application of uniform State
law. Since the criteria are absent in the instant case the
invocation of the concept of applied pre-emption is
most inappropriate.

PARTICULARS OF THE INSTANT CASE
Amicus Curiae are primarily concerned with so
much of the court's opinion that indicates that the
State of Utah has pre-empted the field of regulation
relating to sexual offenses except to the extent of very
narrow delegations implied in the Court's opinion an<l
drawn from the language of the statutes relating specifically to prostitution. Amicus Curiae submit that the
concept of the pre-emption should not be deemed
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applicable to the instant circumstances ·with reference
to the particular issue before the court in the instant
case. Amicus Curiae submit the following observations.
First. The court indicates that it would be improper for a city to punish a misdemeanor for conduct
which is also punishable under State law. Amicus
Curiae does not argue on this concept, but with reference to this conclusion, merely notes:
(a) That the law on this subject is apparently
split between two opposing camps in other jurisdictions
in the United States.
(b) That dicta in at least two cases from this court
leaves some confusion in the area and proper judicial
administration warrants consideration of the dicta in
the two cases and the resolution of the issue.
( c) That there is nothing inherently wrong with
allowing a local government to punish conduct amounting to a felony under State law by a municipal ordinance which is only a misdemeanor since under traditional theories the State could still punish the individual for the same conduct without there being a valid
claim of double jeopardy.
Second. Section 32-2-1 Revised Ordinances of
Salt Lake City, 1965, govern many aspects of sexual
misconduct not covered under State law. Other sections
of Chapter 2, Title 32, Revised Ordinances of Salt
Lake City also control sexual misconduct in instances
other than are treated under State law. By applying
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a broad concept of pre-emption as is set forth in the
court's present opinion many of these ordinances are
subject to challenge and, consequently, are of questionable validity.
Third. It can be argued that Section 32-2-1 (7)
of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City as was
found objectionable in the Court's opinion is in many
instances really not inconsistent with conduct prohibited
under State law governing pandering, but actually
is much' broader and is aimed at curtailing offensive
conduct that is not tantamount to pandering. 76-53-8,
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, relates to the procuring
of a female to be an inmate in a house of prostitution
or persuading a female person to become a prostitute.
This is not the conduct prohibited by subsection 7
of the Salt Lake City Ordinances noted above. 7653-10 relating to profiting by the earnings of fallen
women is the only provision that might be deemed
comparable. In many instances, however, this requires
that the person receive or agree to receive compensation.
Although one provision of the statute does seem to
prohibit directing a female person for the purposes
of prostitution, it is limited to an act of "prostitution"
which may require a showing of something greater than
an offer to perform an act of sexual intercourse for hire
which is all that is required by the city ordinances.
Further, the city ordinances cover directions given for
the purpose of directing one for acts of moral perversion. The city ordinances also cover lewd acts and offers
to direct which do not appear to be encompassed under
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the State law. It may well be, therefore, that the city
ordinances cover many activities not encompassed by
State law and could only be deemed in conflict with
State law because of a differing penalty in one instance.
This court has seemed willing to find that under comparable circumstances the conflict was not so great as
to preclude the enforcement of local ordinances. Salt
Lake City v. Howe, supra.
Fourth. Because of the implications of the concept of pre-emption referred to in the Court's opinion,
efforts by local authorities to control prostitution and
other sexual misconduct will necessarily be hampered.
If State law is the only authority under which municipalities may act except where there is proof of an act
of prostitution itself the prosecution of otherwise guilty
and criminally offensive individuals will be virtually
impossible. In order to arrest for prostitution or fornication which are misdemeanors the arresting officer
would have to have a warrant or observe the offense
being committed in his presence. The opportunity for
the officer to actually observe the criminal offense as
distinct from the preliminary negotiations is exceedingly rare. .Municipalities should be afforded reasonable flexibility to deal with special problems relating
to sexual misconduct within their jurisdiction. The
Court's opinion as presently structured casts doubt on
the power of municipalities and local governments
to so act.
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CONCLUSION
It is submitted that the Court's analysis of the law
and issues as set forth in its previously issued opinion
raised sufficient issues of law which have not been fully
and carefully treated by the court that rehearing is
warranted and re-exploration of the doctrine of preemption is required. It is respectfully submitted that
this court should entertain a motion for rehearing.

Respectfully submitted,

RONALD N. BOYCE
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